The Nuclear Option
The Nuclear Option
Will Putin choose escalation?
Concerns are rising that Russia could use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. The worse the war goes for Russia, the greater the chance that Putin could decide to use a nuclear weapon. But there are no indications that Russia is actually planning to use a nuclear weapon. Nor does it seem likely that using a nuclear weapon would do much to improve the military or political situation for Russia.
Russia is losing the war in Ukraine. Since early September—after two months of relative stalemate—Ukraine has driven Russian forces steadily out of the Kharkiv region. Russia has already lost something like 90,000 thousand troops in the war. Less than two weeks after the Ukrainian counteroffensive began, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced plans to mobilize 200,000 additional men to fight in Ukraine. Putin also warned—after accusing western countries of “nuclear blackmail”—that Russia would “make use of all weapon systems available to us.” He followed up by announcing that Russia was formally annexing the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhshia regions, saying the people living in the still contested regions would be Russian citizens “forever.”
The mobilization order may ultimately prevent Russia from being driven from Ukraine completely, but it’s unlikely to do much to slow the current Ukrainian advance, since it will be months before new troops will be able to fight effectively. Russia is unable to properly equip and supply the forces it has in the field as it is. But the mobilization order did bring the war home to ordinary Russians, who now face the prospect being sent to the front lines. In the days that followed, hundreds of thousands fled Russia to avoid conscription. Protests broke out across the country, with protestors chanting “Send Putin to the trenches!”
On October 10—the day after Putin’s birthday—things got even worse for him. The bridge across the Kerch Strait that connects Crimea and Russia was badly damaged by a truck bomb. The bridge had been built at great expense just four years ago. It had been opened with great fanfare in 2018, when Putin himself ceremonially drove a truck across it. Because it is the only direct route from Russia, it’s vital to supplying the Crimean peninsula and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine supplied. The bridge has now been partially reopened, but the amount of traffic it can support is limited, which will make the already serious logistical problems Russia faces worse.
Putin has no good options. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a humiliating, costly fiasco. He can’t achieve the expansive military objectives on which he has staked his regime without the collapse of Ukrainian resistance and the Western coalition. His mobilization order may temporarily satisfy calls from his hard-right supporters for more aggressive action but is unlikely to have much of an impact on the immediate strategic situation. Russian resistance to the war will only grow as more Russians are forced to fight and are killed in Ukraine. Russia responded to the attack on the Kerch Strait bridge by striking targets with relatively little strategic value in Kyiv and other cities. As Lawrence Freedman writes, it wasn’t a serious new strategy for winning the war, but a tantrum.
Putin could choose to escalate rather than face the prospect of defeat. The recent strikes against Kyiv and other cities are a reminder that Russia has the capacity to obliterate Ukrainian cities if it chooses. As I wrote in March, disastrous wars are one of the few things that can topple authoritarian leaders. Looking weak or ineffectual could jeopardize his hold on power. He faces pressure from hardliners like Ramzan Kadyrov, who called on Telegram for “more drastic measures,” up to “the use of low-yield nuclear weapons.” If the war continues to go badly for Russia, nuclear weapons are a wild card that could shift the terms of the conflict dramatically and shake the resolve of the coalition that opposes Russia. “Putin always chooses escalation,” a source who has worked with Putin told Farida Rustamova. “And he will continue to choose escalation at any unpleasant juncture, up to and including nuclear weapons.”
But we shouldn’t get ahead of ourselves—right now Putin is just making vague threats. Western intelligence services say they haven’t seen signs Russia is actually preparing to use nuclear weapons. Recent open source intelligence concerns that Russia was moving nuclear weapons on a train appear to have been overblown. No one really doubts that Russia would use nuclear weapons if its actual territory were invaded, but threats to use them offensively in Ukraine are less credible. It’s not even clear how easily Putin could give such an order. In any case, Russia appears to be planning for a protracted, conventional war in Ukraine. Putin may believe that time is on Russia’s side. The troops Russia is mobilizing will eventually make a difference on the battlefield. In the meantime, high energy prices in Europe this winter may undermine western support for Ukraine. Putin’s hold on power is probably strong enough for him to survive a defeat and even declare victory anyway.
The truth is—although Putin could have a different view—it’s hard to see how using nuclear weapons would improve Russia’s situation. A single attack would probably not substantially change the military situation or make Ukraine capitulate. The radiation and fallout from a nuclear attack would be hard to predict and could also rebound on Russia. If Russia did use a nuclear weapon, it would probably further unify the western coalition and cost Russia the support of China and India—as well as risk leading to a broader nuclear war. I’ll worry more if Russia actually moves nuclear weapons into position, or conducts nuclear tests as a demonstration to signal its willingness to use them, or makes clear, specific threats.
The median view of The Swift Centre’s forecasting panel is that there is about a 9% chance Russia will use a nuclear weapon by April 30. I contributed to the Swift forecast but again differ pretty sharply with the median view. I do agree with the panel view that the risk increases the more success Ukraine has on the battlefield, and that it would increase even more dramatically if NATO intervened with ground forces or attempted to impose a no-fly zone. The Samotsvety forecasting team estimated on October 3 that there was a 5% chance Russia would use a nuclear weapon in Ukraine within a month and a 16% chance within a year. I think the immediate probability at least is much lower, because Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons without clear warning or before it has exhausted more of its options.
My Forecast
5% chance Russia uses a nuclear weapon against Ukraine by April 30
Wednesday was three months since my stroke. I’m doing much better, but will continue to post intermittently while I focus on my physical therapy. In the meantime, I recommend this excellent piece in The Financial Times on the Ukrainian offensive in Kharkiv; Farida Rustamova’s piece about her conversations with Russian civil servants, politicians, and executives about the mobilization order and the war in Ukraine; and Isaac Chotiner’s interview with Ankit Panda about how close Putin is to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine. As always, if you found this interesting or valuable, please share it with others!
Thanks for this article. I am really happy to hear that your recovery is going well. Good luck!
You didn't mention the India and China relationships.