Overnight, I can't stop thinking about this Hegelian perspective. Why I don't get is, what are the internal contradictions of liberal democracy that should now lead to its unraveling? Liberal democracy still seems mighty fine to me.
Yeah, it seems fine to me too. It tends to seem pretty good to people who belong in some sense to the elite. My theory is that with Soviet communism defeated and many of the battles over legal discrimination in the past, defending liberal democracy no longer seems vital to people for whom the system isn’t working well or for whom the history seems more remote. In particular, it doesn’t give many young men a sense of heroic purpose beyond “don’t be assholes.” Preaching the importance of liberalism can seem like and sometimes is condescending sanctimony. It doesn’t address the issues people are facing very well. I think we need to reformulate fundamental liberal ideas in a way that speaks to people who don’t have much sense of what the loss of them will mean, but I’m afraid that will be hard to do until we begin to reap what we have sown.
Before we go all Hegelian on the moment, let’s recall that after Hegel saw Napoleon inexorably anting an era in history, the old aristocratic orders were restored and ruled for another century.
True. But are eras ever replaced entirely by what came before? Not that I can see in the historical record. And I'm pretty sure that what unfolded is far outside what Hegel imagine History would inevitably deliver, although that's speculation because if there was ever a prognosticator who use vague language to advantage it was that old oracle.
I agree that historical change is not total or decisive, although I think Hegel was clearly right that Napoleon was a part of a dramatic shift. But Hegel also seemed to suggest Napoleon was ushering the end of history, which seems clearly wrong.
By 1806, “dramatic shift” was retrodiction. My point is simply that, even “end of history” aside, his expectations — to the extent we can know them from his vaporous writing — were not met even remotely met.
In all seriousness, do you see areas where Lex Cryptographia—systems leveraging digital signatures and cryptographic verification to encode and enforce agreements—could address some of the concerns you’ve pointed out? Are there aspects of law or governance where this approach could realistically make a meaningful difference, or do you think the hurdles, such as adoption, enforcement, and accessibility, remain insurmountable?
That's a really interesting question, Jonathan. I think there's more we can do to ensure enforcement of agreements—and of course Trump goes back on agreements as a deliberate strategy—but I don't think explicit contracts are the main issue here. Most of the institutions and norms I'm thinking of don't really depend on clear commitments to behave in a specific way in different circumstances and it's not obvious to me we would want to precommit ourselves in that way even if we could.
Terrific post. You have allowed me to see Trump in a whole new light. I'm not very happy about this new perspective, but I do feel smarter.
Thanks, Bill! It's not my favorite perspective either, honestly.
Overnight, I can't stop thinking about this Hegelian perspective. Why I don't get is, what are the internal contradictions of liberal democracy that should now lead to its unraveling? Liberal democracy still seems mighty fine to me.
Yeah, it seems fine to me too. It tends to seem pretty good to people who belong in some sense to the elite. My theory is that with Soviet communism defeated and many of the battles over legal discrimination in the past, defending liberal democracy no longer seems vital to people for whom the system isn’t working well or for whom the history seems more remote. In particular, it doesn’t give many young men a sense of heroic purpose beyond “don’t be assholes.” Preaching the importance of liberalism can seem like and sometimes is condescending sanctimony. It doesn’t address the issues people are facing very well. I think we need to reformulate fundamental liberal ideas in a way that speaks to people who don’t have much sense of what the loss of them will mean, but I’m afraid that will be hard to do until we begin to reap what we have sown.
Before we go all Hegelian on the moment, let’s recall that after Hegel saw Napoleon inexorably anting an era in history, the old aristocratic orders were restored and ruled for another century.
Okay, that's fair. But not completely restored. Everything didn't just go back to the way it had been.
True. But are eras ever replaced entirely by what came before? Not that I can see in the historical record. And I'm pretty sure that what unfolded is far outside what Hegel imagine History would inevitably deliver, although that's speculation because if there was ever a prognosticator who use vague language to advantage it was that old oracle.
I agree that historical change is not total or decisive, although I think Hegel was clearly right that Napoleon was a part of a dramatic shift. But Hegel also seemed to suggest Napoleon was ushering the end of history, which seems clearly wrong.
By 1806, “dramatic shift” was retrodiction. My point is simply that, even “end of history” aside, his expectations — to the extent we can know them from his vaporous writing — were not met even remotely met.
In all seriousness, do you see areas where Lex Cryptographia—systems leveraging digital signatures and cryptographic verification to encode and enforce agreements—could address some of the concerns you’ve pointed out? Are there aspects of law or governance where this approach could realistically make a meaningful difference, or do you think the hurdles, such as adoption, enforcement, and accessibility, remain insurmountable?
That's a really interesting question, Jonathan. I think there's more we can do to ensure enforcement of agreements—and of course Trump goes back on agreements as a deliberate strategy—but I don't think explicit contracts are the main issue here. Most of the institutions and norms I'm thinking of don't really depend on clear commitments to behave in a specific way in different circumstances and it's not obvious to me we would want to precommit ourselves in that way even if we could.
Thanks for the interesting insights and parallels, and the lesson on Hegel!