Forecasting Is My Job Now
I got a grant!
I’ve been awarded a grant from the EA Infrastructure Fund to write Telling the Future! It will allow me to write full time and to keep what I write freely available to you. So this is my official announcement that I will be writing Telling the Future for at least a year. I hope you will subscribe and encourage others to subscribe as well. Thank you all for the tremendous support you’ve already given me.
I’m excited to announce that EA Funds has awarded me an Effective Altruism Infrastructure Fund grant to develop Telling the Future. This grant gives me the freedom to write full time for a year without significant financial risk. It also will allow me to keep what I write freely available to the public. I hope that by the end of the year this newsletter will have become something worth supporting in the future. I am incredibly fortunate—and extremely grateful to everyone at EA Funds—to have this opportunity.
As many of you know, I am a “superforecaster”, which means that I’ve demonstrated an ability to consistently forecast geopolitical events more accurately than most people. In addition to writing this newsletter, I work as a forecaster for Good Judgment. Before starting this newsletter I also worked for the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute on the risk of catastrophes severe enough to threaten human civilization. I believe that forecasting is a skill that we can learn and cultivate. As I wrote in my grant proposal, the goal of this newsletter is "to show how we can—both as individuals and as a society—anticipate the future more accurately and make better decisions.”
Subscribing to a newsletter means trusting the author not to fill up your inbox with messages that aren’t worth your time. I’m gratified to see that subscribers are opening an amazing 60% of the newsletter emails I send. I will try to repay your trust that my emails are worth opening by ensuring everything I send contains fresh insight into what’s going to happen and how to think about it.
Without context, point estimates of the probability something will happen—that there’s a 30% chance of this or an 85% chance of that—are often not that useful. We need to know what a forecast means: what assumptions it depends on, what might change it, and how it relates to other forecasts. I started this newsletter—for obvious reasons—by making forecasts related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine: why I thought an invasion was likely; what I thought was surprising about the invasion; whether Russia will use nuclear weapons; how a no-fly zone would affect the chance that Russia uses nuclear weapons; and whether Vladimir Putin will remain in control of Russia. The picture that emerges from this constellation of forecasts is that the war is likely to continue because Putin’s control of the Russian state and of Russia’s nuclear forces likely protects him from personally facing the consequences of his disastrous and immoral actions.
There’s a lot for us to talk and think about now beyond the invasion of Ukraine. We remain in the middle of a global pandemic. Inflation is higher in many places than it has been for years. Rising food prices seem likely to lead to food shortages around the world. Authoritarian populism is challenging democracy everywhere, including in the US where I live. If you were writing a story about global collapse or the emergence of a future dystopia, it might begin this way. There are plenty of reasons to worry. But I am optimistic that a renewed understanding of the challenges we face will inspire us to adapt and grow, and that out of this turmoil we can create a better, more resilient civilization.
This newsletter is a collaborative project. What I love most about writing is how much I learn through the process of articulating my ideas. I never truly understand anything until I make the effort to explain it to others with different experiences and views. I’m counting on you to share your perspectives with me and to help me refine my thinking. I hope ultimately to learn from you as much as you learn from me.
Thank you to everyone who has already subscribed. Your support has been more generous than I ever imagined it could be. I hope you will continue to support this work by participating in discussions and sharing it with others. I believe that together we can see the future a little more clearly and make the world a little better place.
Forecast Update
There seems to be new optimism about the prospects for a peace agreement as Ukrainian and Russian negotiators meet in Istanbul. Russia recently said it would scale back its operations around Kyiv and Chernihiv in order to foster negotiations with Ukraine. Although negotiators seem hopeful progress can be made, both Ukraine and the US were skeptical Russia’s announcement can be taken at face value. “There is what Russia says and what Russia does,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters. “We're focused on the latter—and what Russia is doing is the continued brutalization of Ukraine and its people.”
Whatever Russia’s motives, Russia’s announcement probably reflects the reality that Russia can’t easily capture Kyiv or remove President Zelensky from power. It probably increases the chance that Russia and Ukraine can reach a deal. Last week I estimated there was just an 8% chance of an agreement before June and a 54% chance of an agreement this year. I remain skeptical that an agreement will be reached soon. Complex negotiations involving multiple parties—the US and NATO will have to be involved—take time. Russia and Ukraine are also unlikely to agree on a complete ceasefire while they’re still fighting for control over key objectives in Eastern Ukraine like Kherson and Mariupol. Nevertheless, I think the prospects for peace this year have increased significantly.
At the beginning of March, I wrote that I thought there was an alarming 4% chance Russia would use a nuclear weapon before July (although I did think the chance of a nuclear exchange between Russia and NATO was much smaller). In hindsight, I think 4% was too high. That’s largely because I think Russian nuclear safeguards make it harder for Putin to use a tactical nuclear weapon than I realized. I also think the conflict in Ukraine is substantially less dangerous and less volatile now that a month has passed and Russia appears to have scaled back its war aims.
My revised forecasts:
10% chance of a bilateral ceasefire agreement across Ukraine before June
63% chance of a bilateral ceasefire agreement across Ukraine in 2022
1% chance Russia kills at least one person using a nuclear weapon before July
Should I have changed my forecasts more or less in light of the recent news? Please let me know what you think in the comments.
Thanks to everyone at EA Funds for the opportunity to develop this newsletter. I’m grateful to everyone who supported and encouraged me. I’m grateful in particular to James Bosworth, Balkan Devlen, Michał Dubrawski, Scott Eastman, McKenna Fitzgerald, Evan Gilbert, Atief Heermance, Ezra Karger, and Michael Story for their advice and their support. Most of all, I’m grateful to Meera Garud for encouraging me to always insist on doing what inspires me. If you appreciate my work, please spread the word and share it with others!
Very happy for you! Excited to read what you have in store untethered by daily finances.
Congrats!