> The closest comparison might be the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
It’s not as unprecedented as you make it sound. In 2008 Russia invaded Georgia, marched their tanks all the way to their capital, then proceeded to annex 30% of the country.
Thanks. I probably should have mentioned Georgia. There certainly are a lot of similarities to the current situation. But I think the invasion of Georgia is probably more comparable to fighting mostly over the separatist areas than to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine also has more than 12 times the population of Georgia.
I disagree with the statement, but agree with the overall sentiment (I’m also from Ukraine, so I’m biased). The larger point I was trying to make is this. Putin is slowly upping the pressure and seeing what the West will do. First Georgia – nothing (I say “nothing” to mean nothing that would deter him from doing it again). Then Crimea – nothing. Now – larger Ukraine. If it’s nothing again, he has already pointed at his next targets: countries that have joined NATO after 1970 (likely starting with the Baltics).
When you say you're from Ukraine, do you mean you live there now? What part of the country are you from? I hope that whatever happens you and everyone are all okay.
Can you explain a 40% drop? Seems high. I understand the general concept of escalation / pull back cycles as a way to "farm" resources; historically Russia (and even North Korea) does this often. However, it does seem like there might be a regime change here given the physical troop movement, which is a fairly costly signal (both in resources and international attention) to make these negotiations work, unless there was some good reason that *this* is the time for a costly display of escalation.
I think everything you say is right. It is a costly signal, which is why I think the chance of war is very real. A substantial part of my change in forecast is a revision of my views. I’m afraid I went up too high over weekend when war looked imminent. It’s also possible I went down to low when I posted my update tweets (I would put the probability somewhat higher today). In general, I think I’ve been trying to choose between or weight two different hypotheses. I’m finding it hard because I think there’s a lot of noise and not enough meaningful signal.
I realize I'm not comfortable updating newsletters that already went out except in the case of clear errors, so I'm reverting this to the original post. You can always follow any updates to my thinking in between newsletters on Twitter @rdeneufville.
> The closest comparison might be the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
It’s not as unprecedented as you make it sound. In 2008 Russia invaded Georgia, marched their tanks all the way to their capital, then proceeded to annex 30% of the country.
Thanks. I probably should have mentioned Georgia. There certainly are a lot of similarities to the current situation. But I think the invasion of Georgia is probably more comparable to fighting mostly over the separatist areas than to a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine also has more than 12 times the population of Georgia.
I disagree with the statement, but agree with the overall sentiment (I’m also from Ukraine, so I’m biased). The larger point I was trying to make is this. Putin is slowly upping the pressure and seeing what the West will do. First Georgia – nothing (I say “nothing” to mean nothing that would deter him from doing it again). Then Crimea – nothing. Now – larger Ukraine. If it’s nothing again, he has already pointed at his next targets: countries that have joined NATO after 1970 (likely starting with the Baltics).
When you say you're from Ukraine, do you mean you live there now? What part of the country are you from? I hope that whatever happens you and everyone are all okay.
Thank you. I’ve moved more than 10 years ago. My parents are still there though, in Kyiv.
Can you explain a 40% drop? Seems high. I understand the general concept of escalation / pull back cycles as a way to "farm" resources; historically Russia (and even North Korea) does this often. However, it does seem like there might be a regime change here given the physical troop movement, which is a fairly costly signal (both in resources and international attention) to make these negotiations work, unless there was some good reason that *this* is the time for a costly display of escalation.
I think everything you say is right. It is a costly signal, which is why I think the chance of war is very real. A substantial part of my change in forecast is a revision of my views. I’m afraid I went up too high over weekend when war looked imminent. It’s also possible I went down to low when I posted my update tweets (I would put the probability somewhat higher today). In general, I think I’ve been trying to choose between or weight two different hypotheses. I’m finding it hard because I think there’s a lot of noise and not enough meaningful signal.
I realize I'm not comfortable updating newsletters that already went out except in the case of clear errors, so I'm reverting this to the original post. You can always follow any updates to my thinking in between newsletters on Twitter @rdeneufville.