New Year, New Forecasts
The future starts now
Happy New Year! 2023 is a new beginning both for Telling the Future and for me personally. In this post, I look back at my 2022 forecasts and forward to 2023.
Human history is continually surprising. But when something significant happens—or doesn’t happen—I want Telling the Future readers to be a little less surprised than they otherwise would have been. My goal is to make precise forecasts about difficult, uncertain issues, so readers can anticipate what’s going to happen and understand why it’s likely to happen. Because accurate forecasting requires a nuanced understanding of what’s already going on, I try to provide the detailed context readers need to decide for themselves whether they agree or disagree with my reasoning. My hope is that even when my forecasts are off the mark, they will help readers improve their own thinking. Forecasting is like writing a very preliminary draft of history; it’s an attempt to explain the future before it comes to pass.
When I launched Telling the Future in early February—two weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine—I explained that Russia was probably (65%) going to invade Ukraine before April in spite of the fact that invading would probably be a strategic mistake. Less presciently—this was my biggest forecasting miss of the 2022—I argued that Russia was unlikely (25%) to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shortly after the invasion began, I wrote that the chance that Russia would use a nuclear weapon before July was small, but elevated (4%) (and that it would rise if NATO attempted to impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine), although after a month of war I concluded that the chance that Russia would use a nuclear weapon in that time frame was lower than I initially thought (1%). In March, I also explained that because authoritarian leaders are very hard to remove from power Putin was very likely (94%) to still be President of Russia in January 2023. Both because wars rarely end quickly once they’ve begun and because there wasn’t much that both sides could agree on, I wrote that a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine was unlikely before June (8%) and only slightly more likely than not in 2022 (54%). In April, I argued that the most likely scenario was a military stalemate in Ukraine that could last years.
Also in April—when the Federal Open Market Committee projected PCE inflation in the US would be 4.3%—I there were even odds (50%) the PCE inflation rate would be over 4.7% in 2022. The final number for 2022 won’t be released until later this month, but it was already up to 5.0% for the year through November. In May, I wrote that the US would probably (68%) go into recession by the end of 2023 as a result of the Fed’s effort to control inflation by raising interest rates. That looks somewhat less likely now that—unlike in most previous episodes of inflation—the inflation rate has begun to fall while the unemployment rate remains at just 3.5%.
Over the summer, I argued that because inflation was high and President Biden’s approval ratings were bad, Republicans were extremely likely (96%) to retake the House of Representatives in the November midterm election. In light of the strong reaction to Roe v. Wade being overturned, I revised my forecast, although I still thought Republicans were very likely (78%) to win the House. In August, I wrote that Democrats had a good chance (70%) of holding onto the Senate because Republican candidates in battleground states were so bad they would likely lose states they otherwise would have won. In my final midterm forecast, the week before the election, I wrote that Republicans were very likely (90%) to win a majority in the House, but although the polls had shifted in favor of Republicans—and most prediction markets and forecasting models favored Republicans—Democrats were still likely (52%) to hold onto the Senate.
I also argued over the summer that in spite of President Joe Biden’s poor approval rating, he is very likely (80%) to win the Democratic nomination for president in 2024. I likewise wrote that, even though his influence with the Republican base has clearly faded, former President Donald Trump was still likely (57%) to be the Republican nominee in 2024 and that Florida Governor Ron DeSantis was much less likely (16%) to be the nominee. However, after the candidates Trump endorsed performed poorly in the midterms—and DeSantis performed very well—I concluded that Trump is less likely (35%) to win the nomination than I had thought, although I still think he’s more likely to win it than DeSantis (28%).
More than 600 people in 58 different countries have subscribed to Telling the Future since I predicted the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. I’m proud of my record of accuracy on difficult political and economic questions. My 2022 forecasts for which the outcome is already determined have a Brier score—where 0 represents correctly predicting every outcome with 100% confidence and 0.250 is essentially equivalent to flipping a coin—of just 0.138. Readers say Telling the Future is “an invaluable resource” that is “clear, well-sourced, and well-reasoned, in an environment that is very rarely any of those things.”
But life is continually surprising. In July I had a stroke that initially left me unable to walk without assistance or focus my eyes. Although I was at elevated risk for a stroke, it’s unusual for someone my age to have one. After nearly three weeks in the hospital and six months of physical therapy exercises, I feel fortunate to be able to walk and see more or less normally again. While I was recovering I didn’t have the capacity to forecast or write consistently, but I should finally be able to get back to publishing more regularly and about a wider range of topics. I’m deeply grateful to readers of Telling the Future for their patience and for their continued support during what has been a difficult time. I hope you will join me as we try to make sense of 2023.
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Some terrific analysis in 2022, Robert. On a personal note, I hope my prediction for your continued physical recuperation is also accurate!
Thank you for this project. Your predictions throughout the year have been a pleasure to read!